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1. Introduction
Adelino Cattani’s conceptual analyses are aimed at developing a normative account of
convincing as opposed to a theory of persuading. The Author builds his main line of argument
upon the definitions of persuading (understood as an activity concentrated mainly on a
speaker) and convincing (which is claimed to be “centred chiefly on the addressee and
focused on one’s capacity of being convinced and of evaluating rationally”; see p. 1). Due to
putting an emphasis on how convincing should be understood, the paper may be interpreted as
an attempt towards providing its normative take. Cattani claims that convincing, as opposed to
persuading, is
a communication activity aimed at causing objective changes in someone’s belief set,
whereas persuading is related to speaker’s techniques employed in influencing an
audience. In this commentary, I will concentrate on issues related to the lexical
analysis (section 2), the differences between logic and rhetoric (section 3), and those
between logos and ethos (section 4). I will claim that the proposed method of lexical
analysis does not have to exclude combining logic with rhetoric. More specifically, I
will argue that the Aristotelian roots of understanding the communicative role of ethos
may provide us with good arguments in favour of treating logic with rhetoric as
legitimate components of the theory of rational and reasonable convincing.
2. Lexical Analysis
The approach presented in the paper may be interpreted as a normative take on conviction and
persuasion. I am generally in favour of the approach that consists of analysing carefully the
relations between the concepts the understanding of which is crucial to building elements of
a theory of rational conviction – which is one of the main goals of Cattani’s paper. These
concepts have been arranged in the paper using the following pairs of notions: logic –
rhetoric, convincing – persuading, and polemics – dialogue.
Cattani’s approach consists of giving “lexical evidence for a difference” between the
key notions in English and in Italian (see, e.g., p. 3). This approach is claimed to be helpful
in determining boundaries between logic and rhetoric, convincing and persuading, and
dialogue and polemic. I agree that the careful analysis of the origins of the key notions may
turn out to be helpful in capturing main differences, however, the question arises: are lexical
analyses that point to some linguistically interesting differences between notions rather an
inspiration for building the conceptual framework than a solution for the robust theory of
convincing?
A sample of this kind of lexical analysis can be found on p. 3: “Why do we lack of
a lexicographic entry indicating the antonym of the act of ‘convincing’? This anomaly tells
us a lot, and it is equally noteworthy that it does not exist the antonym of the verb ‘to
dedicate,’ which should hypothetically sound like *to dis-dedicate.” The lack of the antonym

is claimed to constitute an evidence for distinguishing convincing from persuading”. I would
agree that it may be some argument in favour of using the term ‘convincing’ to denote
rational communication activities as distinguished from persuasion, but I would not say that it
should constitute a foundation for the fully fledged theory of convincing.
3. Logic and rhetoric
The important point of departure for Cattani’s theory of convincing is table on page 1 which
points to ‘the positive and the negative traits’ of rhetoric. My impression is that this table also
contains two different notions of rhetoric, namely: (i) rhetoric understood as an art of pure
persuasion where goals other than persuading the audience do not basically matter in terms of
successful communication; and (ii) rhetoric conceived as the art of rational persuasion
undertook by means of speaker’s genuine ethos (the character of the speaker), strong and
valid logos (correct reasoning), and adequate pathos (evoking proper emotions of an
audience). Whereas some of the expressions from the first column of the table, by
emphasising traits such as ‘vacuous speech’ or ‘manipulation’ clearly refer to the first notion
(rhetoric as pure art of persuasion), a term vir bonus dicendi peritus (“a good man skilled in
the art of speaking”), by pointing the speaker’s moral traits, refers to the second notion
because the reference to the speaker’s character (vir bonus).
While referring to differences between rhetoric and logic, Cattani states: “we tend
to keep distance from rhetoric, especially from rhetorical moves in favour of logical rules.
In logical terms, we prefer to speak of ‘rules’, while in rhetorical terms we prefer to speak of
‘moves.’. Logical rules are clear and universally approved, while rhetorical moves are
questionable and debatable” (p. 2). I agree that the distinction between rules and moves may
tell us something interesting about logically and rhetorically driven argumentation. But,
as a comparison, let us observe that designing dialogue protocols (e.g., Hamblin, 1970;
Walton & Krabbe, 1995) are about the reasonableness of dialogue moves. In an analogous
way, we can speak of the rationality of rhetorical moves.
For instance, if a given rhetorical figure, such as synecdoche which consists of
substituting a whole for a part or vice versa (see, e.g., Fahnestock, 2011, pp. 101-102), may be
a fair rhetorical tool used in order to emphasise the logos-related aspects of the speech by
pointing to the most important part of the whole which could, for instance, constitute the core
of one’s argument. Hence, mentioning rhetorical moves in the broader context of logos (as
means that are not directly related to logos but which may emphasise the line of argument)
does not seem to constitute an ultimate evidence for opposing rhetoric and logic. In a similar
manner, we could point out some other figures of speech that are uses to emphasise logos. In
other words, if we understand a rhetorical speech holistically, we may see that logos is not
always separable from, e.g., ethos. This argument could serve as one against advocating the
establishment of sharp boundaries between logic and rhetoric.
However, apart from some clearly positive and negative traits of rhetoric that have
been incorporated in the same table (p. 1), there are some other traits that do not seem to
emphasise neither the ‘negative’ nor the ‘positive’ flavour of rhetoric. If we take, for example,
traits such as ‘practice of persuasion’ and ‘discursive technique’ from the first column of the
table (containing the negative traits of rhetoric), they seem to be rather neutral. A similar
observation could seem to be true for the term ‘practice of persuasion’, unless one defines
persuasion in a purely negative way and thus associates it with manipulative techniques.

4. Logos and ethos
Cattani also sketches a boundary between logic and rhetoric by means of ethical concepts:
“Since ‘good’ means basically ‘honest’ and ‘logic,’ we should determine if ethic and logic on
one hand, and rhetoric on the other hand, are in conflict; if conviction and persuasion are
really such different things; if the apology of dialogue (which seems to get along with logic)
and the apology of polemic (which seems to get along with rhetoric) may coexist” (p. 3). This
proposal seems to be opposed to from the Aristotelian account of rhetoric given in Book 1 of
his On Rhetoric (Aristotle, 1991). Of course, logic has been long opposed to rhetoric, but
given Cattani’s task of providing the foundations for a theory of rational convincing, the
Aristotelian take could be possibly incorporated into his account. In other words, in my view
there is no contradiction between establishing such a theory, and, at the same time, making
use of Aristotle’s insights into the relation between logos and ethos. For instance, this relation
is not only about logos being an indispensable element of the rhetorical speech, which seems
to be just a starting point for further considerations.
It might be here worth emphasising that the characteristics of ethos components,
namely practical wisdom (phronesis), moral virtue (arete), and good will (eunoia)
distinguished in On Rhetoric (Aristotle, 1991, pp. 112-113), also seems to be an argument
against defining rhetoric as opposed to logic. When describing the lack of practical wisdom,
Aristotle claims that “for either through lack of practical sense they [speakers] do not form
opinions rightly” (p. 112). This example claim may show that despite of the fact that
phronesis is a component of ethos, it may be claimed to be indirectly related to logos, as the
practical knowledge constituting phronesis can also contain the knowledge of the rules of
inference which constitute the core of logos. Being sympathetic to Cattani’s lexical approach
discussed in section 2, I think it does not have to incorporate the treatment of logos and ethos
as mutually exclusive concepts.
Despite the above issues regarding the relation between logos and ethos along with
some concerns about confronting main concepts, a further systematic inquiry employing the
lexical analysis outlined in the paper may lead to an elaboration on detailed characteristics of
rational convincing.
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